Guide to the southern Thailand separatist movement
Thai soldiers inspect the site of a separatist explosion
The Islamic insurgency in Thailand’s deep south has been slowly escalating, making one of the least visited parts of the Kingdom out-of-bounds once again. But with the recent red shirt protests and civil unrest of a more mainstream variety, the southern separatist movement has dropped down the news agenda. Here we look at the background to the situation and prospects for tapping into the rich tourism potential that certainly exists there.
The southern Thailand troubles exist mainly in the Malay Pattani region, which makes up the three southernmost provinces of Songkhla, Narathiwat and Yala. But the violence has increasingly spilled over into other provinces, rapidly escalating with sporadic but regular clashes between armed ethnic militias and the Thai authorities.
In July 2005, Thailand’s fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra gave himself wide-ranging emergency powers to handle the insurgency. In September of the next year, Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was given even more extraordinary executive powers to vanquish the separatists.
But that same month, Sonthi and a military junta ousted Thaksin in a coup citing widespread corruption. The insurgency intensified in the wake of this, and the 1,400 death toll prior to the coup rose by more than 1,000 over the course of the next year. More on safety in Thailand.
Despite making minimal progress, the junta declared that security was improving. However, the death toll surpassed 3,000 by March 2008. Despite similar optimism during the subsequent rule of the Democrat-led coalition led by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, violence continued to increase unabated until March 2011 when the Thai authorities finally admitted that the problem had no clear end in sight.
Causes of the southern Thailand insurgency
News report of Feb 2011 rebel attack
Some people believe that the insurgency is based on the historic 200-year ‘occupation’ of the south, the 1960s resettlement of northeastern people to the region and to Thai cultural and economic imperialism in Pattani. The latter includes allegations of police brutality, criminality, enshrined disrespect of Islam, the prevalence of culturally insensitive businesses such as pubs, drug trafficking and widespread corruption. However, many urban Thais believe that drug trafficking through the region is a major source of income for the insurgents.
While a good proportion of Thais within the three southernmost states undoubtedly support some kind of independence from Thailand, around 87 per cent of people in the region supported the junta-backed constitution in the 2006 referendum. The simple truth seems to be that most southern residents want negotiations and the cessation of violence to bring prosperity, respect for human rights from both sides and a return to the rule of law.
Players in the insurgency
Pattani guerrilla groups began in 2001, but their identity remains relatively obscure. Speculation that Pattani separatist groups have connections with jihadist organisations such as al Qaeda appears to be unfounded, as southern Thai insurgents only tend to attack military targets and have never adopted fundamentalist rhetoric.
Four star PULO is considered the most respected and popular separatist group in the Patani region and has not insignificant political clout. But little is known about the group as they choose to stay out of the media spotlight and work under a policy of silence. But this group has become increasingly visible in recent years and has been able to demonstrate their considerable influence by gathering active separatist and organizing them under their political wing.
Many of the traditional separatist political groups – such as PULO, BRN and GMIP – have been accused of having direct influence over certain armed militias. Other politicians, including former PM Thaksin Shinawatra on 2002, denied that religion played any part in skirmishes as many of the victims where themselves Muslim. The implication was that the insurgents were simply criminal bandits vying for greater control of the area’s drug trafficking operations.
Certainly, a striking aspect of the southern Thailand insurgency is the anonymity of the perpetrators and the absence of concrete demands. During Thailand’s relatively free elections in February 2005 (taking into account the subsequent coup), no secessionist candidates put themselves forward in the south. However, requests for religious and cultural freedom, including the right to use the Yawi language, have been repeated many times.
Despite ongoing attempts to enter negotiations, violence in the region is escalating. As recently as June 2, 2001, eight Navy SEALS clashed with five RKK insurgents in the Budo Mountain Range, resulting the death of three of the insurgents. And two days later, Thai soldiers managed to locate two bombs in the middle of Tak Bai Market which would have probably claimed many civilian lives if it exploded without warning.
Certainly, with the upcoming election and the lack of any clear outcome apparent, it seems that the southern Thailand region will remain out-of-bounds for a long time to come. More on the history of Thailand.
blog comments powered by Disqus